Showing posts with label court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label court. Show all posts
Sunday, May 14, 2017
District Court Denies Novozymes Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Battle for Control of the Alpha Amylase Market
District Court Denies Novozymes Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Battle for Control of the Alpha Amylase Market
On September 24, 2010, a federal district court in the Western District of Wisconsin denied a motion for preliminary injunction in a patent lawsuit between two of the leading companies in the field of genetically engineered industrial enzymes, Novozymes and Genencor (a division of Danisco). The two companies are essentially the only competitors in the market for alpha-amylases, used to convert corn into fuel ethanol. According to the order (available here) denying preliminary injunction, Genencor dominated the alpha-amylase market until 1999, when Novozymes entered the market with Liquozyme, a genetically engineered thermostable alpha-amylase. At one point, Liquozyme accounted for more than 80% of the alpha-amylase sold in the fuel ethanol market. In 2008, Genencor responded by introducing its own genetically engineered thermostable alpha-amylases (called GC358). Since then, Novozymes market share has dropped approximately 60%.
The patent being asserted by Novozymes, US patent number 7,713,723 (the 723 patent) claims priority to a patent application originally filed in 2000. The original patent application was broadly directed toward alpha-amylase mutants having increased stability at high temperature and/or low pH conditions, in particular at low calcium concentrations. However, the claims that ultimately issued in the 723 patent, which recite thermostable alpha-amylase variants comprising "a substitution of serine at position 239 relative to the parent alpha-amylase," were not added until 2009, apparently in response to Genencors marketing of GC358, which presumably includes this mutation. Prior to the introduction of these claims in 2009, the patent application contained no disclosure specifically directed towards substitution of serine at position 239.
Importantly, the 723 patent does not cover Liquozyme, over for that matter any Novozymes product. Liquozyme presumably possesses improved thermostability over the wild type enzyme as a result of a different mutation or set of mutations.
In deciding a motion for preliminary injunction, courts essentially consider four factors: (1) the likelihood the patent owner will ultimately prevail on the merits in the case (i.e., the patent will be found infringed and not invalid); (2) the extent to which the patent owner will experience "irreparable harm" if the infringement is not stopped immediately; (3) the balance of the interests of patent owner an accused infringer; (4) and the public interest. In this case, the district court found that all these factors weighed in favor of Genencor, and denied Novozymes motion for preliminary injunction.
Irreparable Harm
The district court decision began by addressing the issue of irreparable harm, the factor which the court found likely to be dispositive by itself. Novozymes argued that it would suffer irreparable harm in the form of diminished reputation, loss of market share and price erosion if Genencors product were allowed to remain on the market during the course of the litigation. However, the court pointed out that Genencor had entered the market with GC358 in 2008, but that the patent did not issue until May 2010, so that most of Novozymes loss in market share occurred when it was perfectly legal for Genencors product to be on the market. The court surmised that most of the customers who would be inclined to switch from Liquozyme to GC358 had probably already done so, and thus most of the alleged harm identified by Novozymes had already occurred prior to issuance of the patent.
In assessing irreparable harm, the district court found the fact that the patent does not cover any product marketed by Novozymes to be quite significant, pointing out that while Novozymes argument that sale of GC358 would harm its reputation "could be persuasive if plaintiffs actually sold a product that practiced the 723 patent[,] it is difficult for plaintiffs to argue that their good reputation is contingent on their ability to uniquely make and sell [their] patented alpha-amylase when they are not even using the claim technology themselves and identify no plans to do so."
The district court went on to speculate that if "plaintiffs are not trying to protect their own right to provide consumers a product that embodies the patent, then it may be that the patent is nothing more than weapon to prevent defendants from competing with them." In other words, the court seems put off by the fact that Novozymes is not practicing the technology claimed in their patent, treating them as something akin to a non-practicing entity (sometimes referred to as a patent troll).
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The court also expressed doubt with respect to the likelihood that Novozymes would succeed on the merits of the case, based on the courts determination that there was a substantial likelihood that the asserted patent claims are invalid for lack of enablement and lack of sufficient written description. Both the enablement and written description issues arise out of the failure of the originally filed patent application to sufficiently point out and identify the later claimed substitution of serine at position 239. The patent application identified 33 amino acid positions (including position 239) in alpha-amylase which allegedly can be modified by amino acid substitution, deletion or insertion to result in some increased stability under high temperature and/or low pH conditions. It does not, however, particularly point out position 239, nor does it particularly point out substitution with serine (one of 20 amino acids commonly found in proteins), and it does not correlate the specific mutation particularly with thermostability. Genencor pointed out that the patent specification identified 8.589 x 1042 possible amino acid substitutions, deletions and insertions, and now Novozymes was attempting to claim one of those possibilities that had subsequently been shown by Genencor to provide thermostability.
This case illustrates the difficulty the inventors of genetically engineered proteins face when attempting to obtain adequate patent protection for their inventions. Protein sequence space is vast, and in most cases in which a sequence variant of a protein has been found to have some desirable functional characteristic, there are an astronomical number of alternate sequence modifications that will result in the same functional outcome. I have described this problem in a law review article (available here), and more recently in my amicus brief filed in Ariad v. Lilly (available here). Essentially, the written description and enablement requirements limit the ability of protein engineers to claim protein variants in functional terms, resulting in claims limited to enzyme sharing some degree of structural similarity to variants explicitly disclosed in the patent application. This allows competitors to design around the patent by screening for alternate structural modifications to the amino acid sequence that result in the desired function, as exemplified Genencors product that apparently shares the desirable functional characteristics of Novozymes product but employs a different structural modification to the amino acid sequence.
Balance of Harms
The court found that the balance of harms in this case favored Genencor, finding that if Genencor were forced off the market the company might "very will be crippled and unable to recover even if the injunction is lifted after the trial." On the other hand, the court found that Novozymes was essentially "asking for assistance in maintaining a monopoly at least until the end of trial."
Public Interest
The fact that Novozymes is not marketing a product covered by the asserted patent also counted against them in the courts analysis of the effect of an injunction on the public interest. The court found that if Genencors GC358 were taken off the market customers would be deprived of the patented invention entirely for the course of the litigation proceedings, since Novozymes is not marketing any product covered by the patent. The court found it "somewhat inconsistent for plaintiffs to be arguing on one hand that the 723 patent represents an important new invention and then argue on the other hand it should make no difference if no one is allowed to actually use it.
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Tuesday, April 11, 2017
District Court Sees through Misleading Allegations in PubPat Lawsuit against Monsanto
District Court Sees through Misleading Allegations in PubPat Lawsuit against Monsanto
In a recent post, I pointed out similarities between "fabrications" regarding conditions at factories in China manufacturing Apple products, and the misinformation being promulgated regarding gene patents and agricultural biotechnology. Some prime examples of this sort of misleading information are evident, I think, in the lawsuit filed last year by the Public Patent Foundation against Monsanto. In a post on the case, I pointed out that the plaintiffs in the case seemed to lack standing, and that there seemed to be no basis for PubPats allegation that Monsanto had sued involuntary/inadvertent infringers, or that there was any reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs (organic farmers and the like) would be sued for infringing Monsanto patents on recombinant crops.
Fortunately, the district court saw through the exaggerated allegations raised by the Public Patent Foundation in the lawsuit against Monsanto, and dismissed the case last February. The courts decision specifically addresses some of these unfounded assertions.
For example, the complaint alleges that certain plaintiff farmers and seed distributors were afraid that their crops and seeds would be contaminated by recombinant Monsanto products. In rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that none of the plaintiffs claimed that contamination had actually occurred in any of the crops they had grown or seeds they have sold.
The complaint further alleged that organic farmers risked losing their organic certification if their fields became contaminated by recombinant product, but the court found no evidence in the record that any farmer has ever been decertified as organic by the U.S. Department of Agriculture National Organic Program (the NOP) because of seed contamination. In fact, according to the NOP, [o]rganic certification is process based, and as a result, [i]f all aspects of the organic production or handling process were followed correctly, the presence of a detectable residues from a genetically modified organism alone does not constitute a violation of this regulation.
The complaint also alleged that the plaintiff farmers risk being sued for patent infringement based on inadvertent growth of crops with Monsantos patented traits. However, the court found that Monsanto had never filed a patent infringement suit against a certified organic farm or handling operation over the presence of patented traits in its operations. In fact, during oral arguments Monsanto stated that they had never sued the party who did not want to make use of the traits that are manifested in [defendants] transgenic products. The court noted that Monsanto had expressly declared that it is not their policy to exercise [their] patent rights where trace amounts of our seed or traits are present in [a] farmers fields as a result of inadvertent means. The court went on to find that although the complaint alleges without specification that defendants have accused certain non-intentional users of Monsantos seed of patent infringement and threatened them with [litigation, no] plaintiffs claim to have been so threatened.
The complaint alleged that the organic farmers feel threatened by the fact that between 1997 and 2010 Monsanto filed 144 patent infringement lawsuits against farmers. However, the court found that plaintiffs had overstated the magnitude of Monsantos patent enforcement, since this "average of roughly 13 lawsuits per year is hardly significant when compared to the number of farms in the United States, approximately two million."
The plaintiffs alleged that Monsanto had filed patent infringement lawsuits against other farmers who did not want to grow patented crops, citing specific examples where this had allegedly occurred, but the court found that this assertion was:
belied by the decisions in the suits against the referenced individuals. See Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842-44 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (defendant intentionally induced others to infringe Monsantos patents); Monsanto Co. v. Nelson, No. 4:00-CV-1636, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25132, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 10, 2001) (Monsanto alleged that defendants had intentionally saved and replanted second generation seed with patented traits in violation of their licensing agreement); Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2001 FCT 256 [120] (Can.) (finding that the defendant saved and planted seed he knew or ought to have known was Roundup tolerant).
I found it particularly gratifying that the court addressed the widely held misperception that Percy Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer who took Monsanto to the Canadian Supreme Court (and lost) and became somewhat of a folk hero in the process, was an innocent victim whose fields were contaminated by Monsanto product. If you actually read the decisions from the Canadian courts, it is very clear that the court was convinced that Schmeiser had actively selected for and cultivated Monsanto Roundup ready seeds on his property without authorization and without paying any licensing fee (see my previous post).
The court was particularly critical of the Public Patent Foundations characterization of an attempt by Monsanto to reassure organic farmers that they would not be sued for inadvertent infringement as an "implicit threat" by Monsanto. The Public Patent Foundation had written a letter to Monsanto basically asking for a blanket immunity for all the plaintiffs against ever being sued for patent infringement, even if they did intentionally engage in infringing activity. Monsanto responded with a statement of its policy, which it had previously published in other venues:
It has never been, nor will it be[,] Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or traits are present in [a] farmers fields as a result of inadvertent means.
Amazingly, the Public Patent Foundation characterized Monsantos statement as an implicit threat, and as such the basis for declaratory judgment action.
The court totally rejected this flawed logic, declaring it "objectively unreasonable for plaintiffs to read [the language of Monsanto statement] as a threat." The court also stated that,
"[i]ndeed, plaintiffs letter to defendants seems to have been nothing more than an attempt to create a controversy where none exists. This effort to convert a statement that defendants have no intention of bringing suit into grounds for maintaining a case, if accepted, would disincentivize patentees from ever attempting to provide comfort to those whom they do not intend to sue, behavior which should be countenanced and encouraged. In contrast, plaintiffs argument is baseless and their tactics not to be tolerated.It bears noting that critics of Myriad Genetics have repeatedly complained that Myriad should make an explicit statement that the company promises not to sue entities that infringe its BRCA patents in the context of research or non-commercial testing. But Ive always maintained that Myriad is rightly concerned that such a statement could be used against them. Here we see a perfect example of this, with the Public Patent Foundation using Monsantos attempt to reassure inadvertent infringers that they will not be sued as a weapon against Monsanto.
The district court in this case, fortunately, rejected the argument, and noted that public policy dictates that companies such as Monsanto should be encouraged to provide such reassurance, not punished, and that the Public Patent Foundations tactic of using the statement against Monsanto is "not to be tolerated." But with all the advocacy groups out there gunning for Myriad, is it any wonder the company would be reluctant to open itself up to the negative unintended consequences of an explicit statement of immunity for some infringers?
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Friday, March 31, 2017
District Court Decision in Case Involving Centocors IL 12 Antibody Stelara
District Court Decision in Case Involving Centocors IL 12 Antibody Stelara
In the 1990s Centocor and Abbott both developed human antibodies specific for interleukin 12 ("IL-12", a cytokine), and filed patent applications broadly claiming isolated antibodies that bind IL-12. Abbotts work has resulted in a pharmaceutical composition (briakinumab )that is currently in late stage clinical trials, and two US patents, (6,914,128 and 7,504,485). Centocors has resulted in the FDA approved drug Stelara. In 2007 an interference was declared between Abbotts 128 patent and a pending Centocor patent application, and in 2009 the BPAI decided the interference in favor of Abbott.
Both companies antibody products bind to the P40 subunit of IL-12 (it was not clear to me from reading the decision whether the products bind to the same epitope, although I suspect they do not). The antibodies have substantially different amino acid sequences, and were developed independently using different methodologies.
Abbott has sued Centocor, seeking a declaration that Stelara infringes its 128 and 485 patents. Centocor has sued Abbott seeking a declaration that its product does not infringe the patents, and that the patents are invalid. Centocor has also petitioned the district court for judicial review of the interference decision pursuant to 35 USC 146. All three actions are currently pending before the District Court of Massachusetts.
On March 9, the District Court issued an order deciding multiple motions of summary judgment filed by both parties. Here is a quick summary of some of those decisions.
Issue Preclusion
Abbott filed a motion arguing that Centocor is precluded from raising invalidity of the 128 patent as a defense because it raised the issue during the interference and lost. The District Court denied this motion, based on its determination that the BPAIs decision in the interference was not a "binding final judgment." The court found that under 35 USC 146 a party that loses the interference before the BPAI can seek a de novo trial in Federal District Court on validity issues previously decided by the BPAI, and thus the decision of the board cannot be a "binding final judgment" with preclusive effect in a subsequent infringement action.
Indefiniteness
A number of Abbotts claims define the claimed antibody in terms of the dissociation constant, or "Kd value, for the interaction between the antibody and its target IL-12. Kd is a measure of the affinity of the antibody-antigen interaction, i.e., the strength with which the antibody binds, or attaches to, the antigen. Kd can be determined by measuring the rate constants at which the antibody attaches to and detaches from the antigen. One way of measuring these on and off rates is by use of a technique called surface plasmon resonance ("SPR"), using for example a BIAcore instrument. Abbotts patent specifications disclose that Kd can be determined by SPR using the BIACore System, and identify four scientific articles describing the process.
Centocor argued that the specification did not provide specific instructions that would permit a person reasonably skilled in the art to unambiguously determine the KD value of an antibody using SPR, and asked the court to rule the claims invalid for indefiniteness. Specifically, Centocor argued that SPR could yield different Kd values for the same antibody when tested using different experimental parameters. In particular, Centocor pointed out that the claims do not specify surface density or flow rate parameters.
The district court rejected this argument however. The court read Federal Circuit precedent as establishing that when multiple acceptable standards or methods exist for testing whether a product meets a claim limitation, the patent is indefinite if it does not specify the appropriate standard or method to be used. However, a claim is not indefinite when it does specify the method of measurement, even if it omits details about how to implement the method, so long as a person of ordinary skill could infer those details using industry standards or professional judgment. In this case, the court held that a person skilled in conducting SPR assays could determine the appropriate parameters and adequately discern the bounds of the Kd limitations.
The court found that Centocor had provided no expert testimony refuting Abbotts experts testimony that best practices take these parameters into account, and can provide reliable Kd data. The lack of rebuttal testimony probably was a factor in the District Court deciding the issue of definiteness in favor of Abbott on a motion for summary judgment.
The court also found it significant that many issued US patents claim include claims encompassing antibodies defined in terms of particular binding characteristics as measured by SPR, and none of these patents recite the specific experimental parameters for the SPR assays. Centocor itself is the named assignee on three such patents.
Written Description
The court denied Centocors motion seeking summary judgment that certain claims in the patent are invalid for lack of adequate written description. All of the challenged claims are directed to genuses of functionally defined antibodies. Abbott conceded that its patents do not disclose common structural features for the claimed genuses.
According to the court, the sole issue with respect to adequate written description is whether the patents disclose species that constitute a representative set within each genus claim, reciting the ambiguous standard set forth in UC v. Eli Lilly and its progeny.
Abbotts patent specification discloses multiple antibodies falling within the scope of the claims, but Centocor argued that this disclosure was inadequate because all of the disclosed antibodies share very similar amino acid sequences, while the functionally defined claims would encompass a broad range of amino acid sequences. The high degree of sequence homology of the examples arises from the fact that they are all derived from a single common precursor antibody.
In contrast, Centocors product Stelara originated from a different antibody, and different methodology, and has amino acid sequence that is substantially different from the set of examples disclosed in Abbotts patents. Centocor makes the not unreasonable argument that if Abbotts claims are broad enough to encompass Stelara, then they are too broad to be adequately represented by the group of highly similar antibodies disclosed in Abbotts patents.
However, the court found that compliance with the written description requirement, a question of fact, could not be decided on summary judgment. Significantly, the parties experts disputed the significance of the differences in amino acid sequence between the disclosed antibodies and the range of amino acid sequences encompassed by the claims.
It is interesting to compare the adequacy of written description in this case with the Federal Circuits decision last year in Centocor v. Abbott, discussed here. Both cases involve the same parties and claims directed towards antibodies, but the earlier decision involved antibodies to human TNF-alpha. In the earlier decision, the Federal Circuit held the antibody claim at issue to be invalid for inadequate written description as a matter of law. The Federal Circuits decision seemed to hinge on the facts that the antigen (TNF-alpha) had been previously characterized, and the production of the claimed antibody "comprising a human constant region" was not routine. Both of those criteria seem to be satisfied in the current case involving IL-12 antibody. In distinguishing the Federal Circuits decision in the earlier Centocor case, the district court pointed out that in the TNF-alpha case the specification did not describe a single antibody falling within the scope of the claim.
Prior Art
Centocor also asked the court to rule that Abbotts earlier work on IL-12 antibodies, and also Centocors on Stelara, constitute 102(g) prior art with respect to Abbotts claims. The court denied these motions.
I found one aspect of the courts decision particularly interesting. The court assigned Centocors invention of Stelara a priority date of April 30, 1998. Centocor pointed out that one of the inventors listed on the Abbott patents, Stuart Friedrich, was not employed by Abbott earlier than August 1998, and hence could not have contributed to Abbotts IL-12 research project before then. Centocor argued that the inclusion of Mr. Friedrich as a joint inventor proves the conception was not complete before August 1998.
The district court rejected this argument, however, stating that the proof of priority to a genus claim requires less than what is required to establish adequate written description of that claim. The court went on to conclude that "it is plausible that Abbott invented a species of pharmaceutical composition within the scope of this claims before Centocors priority date of April 30, 1998, but nevertheless required contributions from Mr. Friedrich after that date in order to establish the patentability of Abbotts genus claims under 35 USC 112.
In other words, the district court seems to be saying that an individual can be a joint inventor of a chemical genus even if he does not contribute to the conception of the genus, but only contributes to providing adequate disclosure to establish compliance with section 112. I dont know if there is any precedent to support this unconventional definition of joint inventorship - the District Court does not seem to cite to any.
Infringement
The court held some of Abbotts claims infringed by Stelara.
All of the claims include a limitation to "human antibody," and Centocor unsuccessfully argued that its product is not a human antibody as that term is properly construed in the claims. In particular, the court had construed "human antibody" to mean "an antibody that is derived from human DNA and not from the DNA of any non-human species." Centocor argued that the DNA that encodes its antibody is likely to contain nucleotide sequences that were inserted through N-nucleotide addition inside the cell of a transgenic mouse during production of the antibody. While Abbott conceded that N-nucleotide addition could have occurred, the court concluded that any nucleotide added by this non-template based phenomenon would not be derived from a non-human germline, and thus would not constitute the DNA of a non-human species. It went on to conclude that Stelara satisfies the "human antibody" limitation of the claims.
Based on this interpretation of "human antibody," the court held that Stelara infringes some of the asserted patent claims broadly directed towards pharmaceutical compositions comprising isolated human antibody capable of binding to an epitope on the P40 subunit of IL-12 (see for example claim 1 of US patent 7,504,485).
However, many of the asserted claims also include limitations that can only be ascertained by analytical testing, such as threshold Kd value or IC50. The district court declined to determine the infringement of these claims on summary judgment, given the fact that the experts disputed the results of tests that had been performed, and disagreed as to the methodology to be employed in performing the tests.
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Saturday, March 18, 2017
District Court Rules That Genencor Products Infringe Novozymes Patent
District Court Rules That Genencor Products Infringe Novozymes Patent
On July 7, a federal district court in the Western District of Wisconsin ruled on a motion for summary judgment that a number of Genencors thermostable alpha-amylase products (sold under trade names such as Spezyme) infringe Novozymes US patent number 7,713,723. I have discussed earlier decisions in this case on this blog, including decisions by the District Court denying a motion to invalidate the claims for failure to satisfy the written description requirement (available here) and denying a motion for preliminary injunction (available here).
Claim 1 is representative of the claims found to be infringed:
1. An isolated variant of a parent alpha-amylase, wherein:
(a) the variant has at least 90% sequence identity to SEQ ID NO: 6,
(b) the variant comprises a substitution of serine at position 239 relative to the parent alpha-amylase, using the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 8 for determining position numbering, and
(c) the variant has increased thermostability relative to the parent
alpha-amylase, wherein thermostability is determined at pH 4.5, 90° C. and
5 ppm calcium and has alpha-amylase activity.
Prior to deciding the issue of infringement, the court had to construe several terms appearing in the claims.
For example, the court had to define what "thermostability" means in the context of the claims. The defendant Genencor argued that the term is so indefinite that the claims should be invalidated, but the judge disagreed and held that the term was not so ambiguous as to render the claims invalid. The court spent a lot of time discussing the ambiguity of the term, noting that it could be the case that a protein variant would have more activity than wild type at some time points after exposing the proteins to elevated temperature, but less activity at other time points, and it was not entirely clear from the patent whether this would constitute increased thermostability. However, the court held that even under a relatively narrow interpretation of the term, pursuant to which the protein variant would have to be more active at all time points under elevated temperature, the Genencor products still infringed because the retained higher activity than wild type at all times after exposing the proteins to high temperature.
Another claim term, which the court spent a lot of time was "isolated." Novozymes argued that "isolated" was not a limitation on the claim scope because it is part of the claims preamble. The district court spent some time considering this argument, but ultimately sided with Genencor and held that "isolated" does limit the scope of the claim. In part, it reached this decision because "isolated" did not appear in the claim originally but was introduced during prosecution of the patent application, which the court found implied that the term "isolated" was significant.
The parties disputed the meaning of the term isolated, with Novozymes arguing for a broad interpretation that would cover protein existing at a higher concentration in a cell or cell extract than it would naturally, while Genencor argued for a narrower interpretation in which the protein must to some extent be separated from other cellular components. The court adopted the narrower interpretation, but nonetheless found that most Genencor products infringed because they included isolated protein. However, the court did find that some Genencor products are not infringing in which the thermostable alpha-amylase is not separated from other cellular components, which the court referred to as "whole broth" products, because the protein is not isolated.
The proper interpretation of "isolated" in claims such as this has important implications for biotechnology patenting outside the confines of this particular case. For example, the patent office will not issue patents claiming naturally occurring gene sequences unless the claims specifically recite that the DNA molecule is isolated, purified, and/or recombinant, in order to exclude genes as they occur naturally (for example in the human genome). The assumption is that inclusion of the term "isolated" in the claim limits the scope of the claim. I dont think it is even accurate to consider the use of the term "isolated" in claims of this format as preamble, but in any event it should generally be treated as limiting the scope of the claim.
Furthermore, the scope of the term isolated is important in the context of gene patent. As I have discussed elsewhere, the question of whether genetic diagnostic testing or whole genome sequencing infringes gene patents could in many cases dependent on how broadly a court interprets the term isolated in these claims (I have always assumed that "isolated" is a meaningful limitation on claim scope in this context).
In this case, the prosecution history was apparently silent as to why Novozymes amended the claim to include the "isolated" language. It would not seem to be necessarily required in this case if the claim only covers non-naturally occurring variants, because then there would be no danger of the claim reading on a naturally occurring biomolecule. But perhaps Novozymes intended for the claim to cover naturally occurring thermostable variants, in which case limiting the claim to isolated variants would be necessary in order for the claim to be valid.
In any event, the fact that "isolated" was introduced by amendment was significant, because it led the court to rule that under Festo the term could not be expanded beyond its literal scope under the doctrine of equivalents.
Thanks to Docket Navigator for bringing this decision to my attention.
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Wednesday, March 15, 2017
District Court Rejects Argument that Hatch Waxman Safe Harbor Applies to Genetically Modified Crops
District Court Rejects Argument that Hatch Waxman Safe Harbor Applies to Genetically Modified Crops
I noticed an interesting order issued on November 16 by the District Court hearing Monsanto v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Pioneer Hi-Bred International. The case gathered quite a bit of attention last August when a jury awarded Monsanto a $1 billion verdict for infringement of a patent directed towards Monsantos Roundup Ready gene. Notably, DuPont had never brought the infringing product to market. Under Monsantos damages theory, DuPont is liable for $1 billion in "reasonable royalty" damages to compensate for its use of the patented technology in developing DuPonts Optimum GAT soybean line (which includes both Monsantos Roundup Ready gene and the GAT gene, an alternative to the Roundup Ready gene that also confers resistance to glyphosate (trade name Roundup)). The GAT gene is a synthetic gene developed by Maygen over a decade ago using DNA shuffling technology. The jurys decision was discussed widely on the Internet, for example on the Patently-O blog.
The recent order grants Monsantos motion to exclude evidence regarding DuPonts Hatch-Waxman safe harbor defense. Most of the order is redacted, and I have not read any other rulings or filings the parties have made, but I presume that DuPont is arguing that its infringement of Monsantos patent in the development of recombinant Roundup Ready corn is "reasonably related" to the development and submission of information to obtain Federal marketing approval, and thus falls within the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor. The safe harbor is normally invoked with respect to drugs and medical devices regulated by FDA.
To my knowledge, the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor has never been successfully invoked with respect to an agricultural product, and the conventional wisdom would have it that the safe harbor is limited to drugs and medical devices (see, for example, Dennis Crouchs Patently-O blog post cited above). According to the courts order, DuPont has argued for a broader interpretation of the safe harbor provision by relying on the following language from the Supreme Courts 2005 decision in Merck v. Integra: [the] exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA." The District Court held that DuPont had taken the Supreme Courts statement out of context, and that Merck did not expand the coverage of the safe harbor provision beyond pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
The Hatch-Waxman safe harbor, codified as 35 USC 271(e)(1), states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses a reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological product.
Congress created the safe harbor in 1984 order to speed the approval of generic drugs, at least partially in response to Roche v. Bolar, a 1984 Federal Circuit decision which held that the common law "research use" exception does not apply to infringing activities by a generic company engaged in for the purpose of generating data necessary for FDA approval of the generic drug. However, the courts have interpreted the statute more broadly, extending the safe harbor to non-drug products and to infringing activities not directed solely to obtaining FDA approval.
For example, in 1990, the Supreme Court held in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic that the safe harbor is not limited to drugs, but also extends to medical devices. In assessing whether the safe harbor could also apply to an agricultural product like corn, it is informative to consider how the Supreme Court arrived at its holding in Medtronic.
To summarize, the Supreme Court found that Congress had enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to eliminate to unintended distortions of the effective patent term resulting from the premarket approval required for certain products by the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). The first distortion was the reduction of the effective patent life caused by delays associated with obtaining FDA premarket approval. The second distortion was the de facto extension of effective patent life at the end of the patent term which resulted from the inability of a generic competitor to undertake activities necessary for obtaining FDA approval until after the patent expired. This second distortion was reinforced by the Federal Circuits decision in Roche v. Bolar.
According to the Supreme Court, the Hatch-Waxman Act addresses the first of these distortions by providing patent term extension for patents claiming a "product" subject to regulatory delays caused by the FDA premarket approval process (codified under 35 USC 156). It addresses the second distortion by means of the safe harbor. Congress intended the safe harbor to allow competitors to begin the regulatory approval process while the patents are still in force, followed by market entry immediately upon patent expiration.
The scope of the safe harbor is determined largely by the interpretation of two critical terms in 35 USC 271(e)(1), "patented invention" and "reasonably related." In Medtronic, the Supreme Court concluded that the patent term extension and the safe harbor provisions are complementary, meant to address the two distortions, and tending to offset each other. Based on this conclusion, the Court interpreted the term "patented invention" in section 271(e)(1) to include all products listed in 35 USC 156(f) as eligible for patent term extension, including drugs, medical devices, food additives, and color additives. So while Medtronic explicitly held that the safe harbor extends to medical devices, the logic of the decision dictates that it should also extends to food additives. I havent researched the question, but I am not aware of any judicial decisions explicitly holding that the safe harbor extends to food additives. Nevertheless, under my reading of Medtronic I think it should.
Whether or not DuPont is entitled to rely on the safe harbor could hinge largely on whether its product is a food additive is under 35 USC 156. The infringement results from the unauthorized introduction of the Roundup Ready gene into DuPonts soybean line. So the question becomes, is the Roundup ready gene (and its protein product) a food additive under 35 USC 156 that qualifies for the safe harbor under Medtronic?
Im no expert on FDA regulation of genetically modified plants, and I have not researched the issue in any depth, but my sense is that there is no clear answer to the question of whether Roundup Ready corn should be treated as a food additive eligible for the safe harbor. Section 201(s) of the FDCA defines a food additive broadly to include all substances that may reasonably be expected to become components of food, but expressly excludes substances that are generally recognized as safe (GRAS). My understanding is that the FDA has taken the position that, with respect to foods derived from genetically modified plants, both the genetic construct and the protein expressed by the gene, could be considered food additives. However, it has also indicated that most foods derived from genetically modified plants are presumptively GRAS. According to a white paper published by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, entitled Guide to US Regulation of Genetically Modified Food and Agricultural Biotechnology Products, the only genetically modified food that has triggered the food additive process is Calgenes FLAVR SAVR tomato. FDA approved the selectable marker gene used in the tomato, which encodes resistance to the antibiotic kanamycin and its gene product as a food additive in 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 26,700.
Again, based on my understanding, it seems that the Roundup ready gene and its product are probably not food additives simply because Monsanto (and other developers of Roundup ready products) have represented to FDA that the gene and its product is GRAS, and FDA has acquiesced. But what if DuPont had chosen to treat the Roundup Ready gene as a food additive, and sought premarket approval from FDA? Wouldnt that make the Roundup ready gene a food additive, and hence eligible for the safe harbor? And is it too late for DuPont to seek FDA approval for Roundup ready as a food additive? Would not that render Roundup ready a food additive just like Calgenes kanamycin resistance gene?
Even if DuPont does not seek FDA approval of Roundup ready as a food additive, I think that Federal Circuit precedent does not rule out the possibility that Roundup Ready is nonetheless a food additive eligible for the safe harbor. To illustrate, in 1997 the Federal Circuit held in AbTox v. Exitron that the safe harbor applies to "all inventions" within 35 USC 156, regardless of whether the product qualifies for patent term extension. In particular, the safe harbor applies to Class II medical devices, even though these medical devices are ineligible for patent term extension (Medtronicinvolved a Class III medical device, a category of medical device that is eligible for patent term extension). In other words, the Federal Circuit extended the range of safe harbor-eligible subject matter to include products lacking the symmetry of an offsetting patent term adjustment. I could imagine some judges on the Federal Circuit deciding that a recombinant trait such as Roundup ready is a food additive, even if the manufacturer did not seek pre-marketing approval as a food additive, based on the fact that FDA can regulate recombinant genes and their products as food additives, and apparently has done so at least once in the past.
Assuming for the sake of discussion that DuPont could establish that the Roundup ready trait in its soybean is a food additive for purposes of the safe harbor, the safe harbor would only apply if DuPonts infringing activity was "reasonably related" to potentially securing FDA approval. In 1992, the Federal Circuit held in Telectronics Pacing Systems v. Ventritrex that demonstrating a medical device at medical conferences was "reasonably related" to FDA approval because it facilitated the selection of clinical trial investigators. In 2005, the Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra held that "reasonably related" activity does not require actual submission of information to FDA, but also includes those situations in which a party has a "reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, . . . and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA." On remand, the Federal Circuit held that the preclinical research in question was "reasonably related" to FDA approval. Perhaps DuPont could show that its pre-marketing activities developing the infringing Roundup ready soybean were reasonably related to the generation of data that might plausibly have been submitted to FDA.
Genetically modified agricultural products generally require pre-marketing approval from EPA and/or USDA. This form of pre-marketing approval is outside the FDCA, and so does not appear to fall within the literal scope of the safe harbor statute, i.e., these are not Federal laws "which regulate the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. However, with the imminent expiration of RoundupReady patents, there is a great deal of interest in providing a pathway for the approval of "generic" recombinant agricultural products. Congress could consider expanding the safe harbor, for example by removing the statutory limitation to laws which regulate drugs, to include other regulatory laws, such as those applicable non-drug technologies that require premarket approval, genetically modified plants for instance.
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